Without being forced to partner since missions would not be approved without minimum partner force ratios being met , many U. Instead of adapting to implement the strategy, tactical U. The minimum-force requirements led to operations that were technically but not substantively partnered. Afghans would be placed within the patrol where they could have the least influence on the mission, or in some cases at the front of the patrol to provide an Afghan veneer during interactions with the local population.
While scholars and practitioners have argued that some militaries are more effective at advising than others, our respective experiences with the Marines and the Army, in both conventional and special operations, suggest that the preference to fight was universal in Afghanistan. Even among purpose-built Army Special Forces advisor teams there was often a proclivity to conduct kinetic operations rather than work through the partner force.
Our anecdotal observations are supported by our own academic research, which includes dozens of interviews with U. Why do troops prefer unilateral operations over working through partners?
It is not out of apathy or tactical incompetence. Instead, a preference for unilateral combat operations is the rational response under conditions in which working with partners is difficult, dangerous, disappointing, and downright contradictory to the warrior culture.
Combat is dangerous and exhausting work — but is a walk in the park compared to combat by, with, and through partners. First, working with partners who do not share a common language, both literally and professionally, is difficult.
Even Afghans who spoke some English were not familiar with U. This meant that any individual task took longer, often much longer, through partner forces. This is frustrating in mission planning and deadly when coordinating battlefield maneuvers under fire, where quick and effective communication can mean the difference between life and death.
The threat of insider attacks also made working with partners more dangerous than cutting them out of mission planning. Tactical units faced a dilemma of following far-off strategic guidance to plan with their partners, and the immediate reality that their partner might pass sensitive intelligence about upcoming patrols to the enemy.
The result was that Afghan units rarely participated in mission planning, boding poorly for their readiness to assume security operations once U. Even for troops willing to assume the extra work and risk of working with partners, they were often disappointed by their lack of value added to the mission, especially based on U.
While some argue that indigenous forces provide advantage through knowledge of local culture, it was common for Afghan National Security Forces to work in regions where they did not speak the same language as locals, or even held antagonism against the population.
The drive to make-mission is much stronger than the tolerance to let weaker partners quasi-address threats in their own way — Afghan good enough was not good enough for tactical units under the gun. Even as U. People who worked at the customs office did not even need to receive a paycheck; it was taken for granted that whoever works at customs will simply collect their commission through the things they steal.
And you are witness to all these things happening around you. What motivation are you going to have to fight? Any honest Afghan commander will tell you that the support network the Americans had been giving them basically went offline, almost literally, from one day to the next.
All the software, gone. Helicopters might be able to lift off for a few more days, but they no longer had the capacity to hunt the Taliban. The Americans had created a situation where their contractors basically ran the software that their sophisticated weapons need to function correctly. Now, imagine you are an Afghan soldier in a firefight. American jets and attack helicopters are hovering overhead, as if they are watching a video game, but they do not lift a finger to give you support.
As an Afghan fighter, what are you supposed to think? The ,strong army with its sophisticated equipment was a mirage from the beginning: It never existed, just as nation-building never existed in Afghanistan.
A native of Bamiyan said that the villagers decided to investigate what became of the money and found that most of the money had been skimmed off by various international organizations before it even reached Afghanistan. They ended up chopping it up for firewood. That is the entire history of America in Afghanistan. Every day, in every province, something like this was happening. But to go back to why the Afghans did not fight. There is a third and most important reason: The Afghan army was not only fighting the Taliban; it was also fighting the Americans themselves and the Ghani government.
There were five thousand Taliban prisoners whom the Americans insisted must be released. The option of a prisoner exchange was not even on the table. The Americans wanted the release of these five thousand right away.
And what is a soldier fighting on the frontlines of Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, or Mazar supposed to think of this? According to the UN, Afghanistan has the third-largest displaced population in the world.
Since , some five million people have fled and not been able to return home, either displaced within Afghanistan or taking refuge in neighbouring countries. How the Taliban plan to govern Afghanistan remains unclear. Women face an uncertain future. Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen says the group will respect the rights of women and minorities "as per Afghan norms and Islamic values".
The militants had declared an amnesty across Afghanistan and said it wanted women to join its government. But there are fears over women's freedom to work, to dress as they choose, or even to leave home alone under Taliban rule.
Another major fear is that the country will once again become a training ground for terrorism. Taliban officials insist that they will fully adhere to the US deal and prevent any group from using Afghan soil as a base for attacks against the US and its allies. They say they aim only to implement an "Islamic government" and will not pose a threat to any other country. But many analysts say the Taliban and al-Qaeda are inseparable, with the latter's fighters heavily embedded and engaged in training activity.
It is also important to remember that the Taliban are not a centralised and unified force. Some leaders may want to keep the West muted by not stirring up trouble but hardliners may be reluctant to break links with al-Qaeda. Just how powerful al-Qaeda is and whether it could now rebuild its global network is also unclear. Its fighter numbers could be only between a few hundred and 2, but it may try to gain footholds in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and parts of Tajikistan, which could be a serious regional concern.
Afghanistan country profile. Afghanistan profile - Timeline. Who are the Taliban? Peace in the shadow of the Taliban? What could peace in Afghanistan look like? How do the Taliban make money? Why Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever. The Taliban could take over Kabul within 90 days, US officials estimated last week. Some 72 hours later, Kabul had fallen. Even the Taliban were reportedly surprised at how quickly they were able to take control of some provinces.
For some, Afghanistan's collapse was 20 years in the making, as mistake after mistake was made in the Western nation-building project.
But the final nail in the coffin of the Afghan government came last year when former US president Donald Trump signed a deal with the insurgents to withdraw US troops by May 1. For the Taliban, it was a sign that their victory was imminent after nearly two decades of war. For Afghans, it was a betrayal and meant their abandonment by the international community. The Taliban continued to attack government forces but started to combine those with the targeted killings of journalists and rights activists, heightening the environment of fear.
They also pushed a narrative of inevitable Taliban victory in their propaganda and psychological operations. Soldiers and local officials were reportedly bombarded with text messages in some areas, urging them to surrender or cooperate with the Taliban to avoid a worse fate. Many were offered safe passage if they left their weapons and did not put up a fight, while others were reached through tribal and village elders.
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